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Abstract
With EU membership, politicians as well as citizens in the accession countries hope to
achieve improvements in living conditions and – at least in the long run – to catch up with
the West European societies. Catch-up modernization of the less advanced member states
is also an ”official” goal of EU policy. Expert opinions about the prospects for success,
however, vary widely. In this paper, a general model for how EU policy influences quality
of life in less well-off member countries is presented. An analysis of former enlargements
– the cohesion countries Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Spain – reveals that EU integration
obviously facilitates processes of catch up but does not guarantee them. This is demonstrat-
ed by using indicators covering different aspects of quality of life, per capita income
(material living conditions), social protection ratios (general quality of society), and life
satisfaction (subjective well-being). Bearing in mind their particular economic and social
conditions and their heterogeneity, the prospects of the future member states are discussed.
Mit der Mitgliedschaft in der EU verbinden Politiker wie Bürger in den Beitrittsländern die
Hoffnung auf verbesserte Lebensbedingungen und – zumindest auf lange Sicht – auf ein
Aufholen gegenüber den wohlhabenden westeuropäischen Gesellschaften. Eine solche
nachholende Modernisierung ist auch offizielles Ziel der EU-Politik. Die Aussichten auf
ein Gelingen werden von Experten aber ganz unterschiedlich beurteilt. In diesem Artikel
wird ein Modell vorgestellt, das zeigt, wie die EU-Mitgliedschaft die Lebensqualität in
ärmeren und leistungsschwächeren Ländern beeinflußt. Der Blick auf frühere Erweiterun-
gen – insbesondere auf die sogenannten Koäsions-Länder Irland, Griechenland, Portugal
und Spanien – zeigt, daß die Integration in die EU vorteilhaft ist, aber dennoch ein Aufholen
gegenüber den Kernländern nicht garantiert. Dies wird anhand verschiedener Indikatoren
illustriert, die exemplarisch verschiedene Aspekte von Lebensqualität abdecken: Pro-
Kopf-Einkommen (materielle Lebensbedingungen), Ausgaben für soziale Sicherung (ge-
nerelle Qualität der Gesellschaft) und Lebenszufriedenheit (subjektives Wohlbefinden).
Unter Berücksichtigung ihrer besonderen Situation und Verschiedenheit werden abschlie-
ßend die Aussichten für die zukünftigen Mitgliedsstaaten diskutiert.
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1 Introduction
The goal of accession to the European Union (EU) has become one of the main driving
forces for the reforms in East Central Europe. Thirteen countries are at various stages in the
process of preparing to join the European Union. These include ten former socialist
countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Roma-
nia, Slovakia, and Slovenia; as well as three Mediterranean countries, Cyprus, Malta, and
Turkey. For the elites as well as for the ordinary people in the prospective member states,
the Union is attractive as it represents political stability and economic prosperity. Citizens
in the former socialist countries initially hoped that the transition to democracy and market
economy would lead to a better life with secure civil rights and liberties, as well as a standard
of living comparable to that of the West European nations. The transformations that took
place in the 1990s only resulted in these expectations being partially met. Hopes for
improvement now rest on EU accession.
The current restructuring taking place in East Central European societies is not this area’s
first attempt to catch up with the West (cf. Andorka 1994, Zapf 1997). In the past, major
waves of modernization swept across Western Europe arriving only after some delay in the
East. After WW II, socialist industrialization reduced the gap in development between the
eastern and western parts of Europe. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, the gap widened
again (cf. Estes, 1997) contributing to the breakdown of the socialist regimes. During the
1990s, the now post-socialist countries made significant advances in terms of democrati-
zation, but experienced severe economic and social problems. Only since the mid-1990s,
has the economic situation stabilized in many of the accession countries, allowing some of
them to begin catching up to the EU nations they regard as a standard of comparison.
Nevertheless, the social situation has remained insecure for a broad strata of the population,
leading to the fear of ending up in a sort of “Latin American situation” (cf. UNICEF, 1997;
Lessenich, 2000) instead of “returning to Europe”.
Measuring ‘catch up’ requires two kinds of comparisons: across time and across space
(cf. European Centre 1993: 294ff.). An across time comparison involves comparing present
and past social conditions within a country. An across space comparison contrasts social
conditions between countries (or other geographical units). If living conditions within a
country improve, we speak of progress. But catching up is more than progress – it implies
that over time a nation lagging behind grows more rapidly (or more generally: performs
better) than those in the lead reducing the gap between them. Ideally, catching up leads to
convergence because of faster rates of improvement in the bottom-ranking countries, and
not because of the deterioration of living conditions in top-ranking countries.
How likely are the potential EU member states to catch up? The optimistic view is that
large-scale and steady economic growth will push the more advanced candidates rather
quickly past the current level of the least prosperous EU member states, and that the “[o]ther
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post-communist countries will follow” (Rose, 1999: 54). In the same vein, Morita (1999)
assumes that integration into the EU will bring about a dynamic development, and the gap
will close quickly. The more pessimistic view is that convergence between the different
economic and social regions of West and East will be difficult as there is currently no EU
master plan to guide this process (cf. Huster 2000: 43). Even with the help of the
Community, the disparities between the two regions “could grow rather than diminish”
(Mencinger, 1999: 12).
This paper deals with the question of whether integration into the EU provides a suitable
framework for catch-up modernization. The paper will review the main instruments of EU
policy that influence quality of life by analyzing earlier enlargement experiences, namely
those of the cohesion countries Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Spain; and by discussing the
special conditions of the candidate countries. The cohesion countries provide suitable cases
for comparison because of their lower level of modernization relative to the core EU
countries at the time of their accession, and because the southern countries made the
transition to democracy roughly ten years before entering the Community (cf. Lessenich,
2000). The structure of the paper is as follows: In the ensuing section, the issue of catch up
is discussed in relation to the EU’s broader aim of achieving cohesion among its member
states (section 2). Next, based on a three-pronged concept of quality of life, a general model
is developed to explain how EU integration influences quality of life in less-advanced
member states (section 3). Using aggregate data from official statistics and data from the
Eurobarometer surveys, the welfare development of the cohesion countries is analyzed
(section 4). Finally, the opportunities and risks faced by the potential member states are
discussed (section 5).
2 The political goal of economic and social cohesion
Catching up is not simply an accession country aspiration, it is also an official EU policy
goal. From the very beginning, the Community embraced countries with different living
conditions. Welfare disparities have changed a great deal during the last decades – mainly
as a result of the integration of new member states. Especially the admission of Ireland in
1973, Greece in 1981, and Portugal and Spain in 1986, made the Community much more
heterogeneous (cf. Welfens, 1999; IMF, 2000) and brought issues concerning the achieve-
ment of economic and social cohesion to the forefront. Under the label cohesion, Brussels
aims not only to improve EU citizens’ welfare, but also to adjust the living and working
conditions within the Community. The major goal is to reduce disparities in levels of
development. Brussels regards cohesion among the member states as one of the pillars of
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integration, alongside the Economic and Monetary Union and the Single Market (cf.
European Commission, 1997). Consequently, the catch-up process of less prosperous
countries is actively supported. Since strong national welfare disparities can cause problems
also for the prosperous countries, a convergence in living conditions is considered
preferable for the core countries of the EU as well (cf. Vobruba, 1997).
As the process of enlargement extends eastward, the aim of cohesion becomes increas-
ingly controversial, first of all because of the much lower levels of income and wealth in
many applicant countries. At present, per capita GDP in purchasing power parities of the
applicants ranges from 81 % (Cyprus) to 22 % (Bulgaria) of the EU average (data from
1999). Five of the 13 countries have an economic level of less than one third of EU average.
In the EU 15, the ratio between the richest and the poorest country is 2,5:1 (Luxembourg
vs. Greece). With the candidates of the so-called “1998 group”, the ratio will double; and
with the candidates of the “2000 group”, the ratio will triple. Huge differences in social
conditions are also reflected in subjective measures of well-being. Levels of happiness and
life satisfaction lower than in even the least-satisfied EU member states characterize the
population in nearly all the accession countries (Inglehart and Klingemann 2000, data from
different points of time, 1990-1998). Bulgarians, Lithuanians and Romanians are some of
the least satisfied peoples in the world. In an enlarged Union it will be a difficult task for
the Community to ensure cohesion, even if some countries make significant progress before
joining.
3 How EU membership influences quality of life:
a general model
Dimensions of welfare
The main focus of the literature on convergence processes is on economic development (e.g.
Pinto and Ramakrishnan, 1996; Morita, 1999). However, since EU policy aims to improve
living conditions and life circumstances in a broader sense, it is fruitful to analyze these
issues using a wider perspective by employing quality of life concepts (cf. Noll, 2000;
Diener and Suh, 1997). I will apply an approach that distinguishes three aspects of welfare:
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material living conditions, measures of quality of society, and subjective evaluations of
well-being. Material living conditions are those citizens’ ascertainable life circumstances,
which depend heavily on economic factors: e.g. income, standard of living, housing,
working conditions, infrastructure. It should be noted though that this is only one set of
factors influencing opportunities for personal development. The ”liveability” (Veenhoven
1997) of the society in which one lives also has a tremendous influence. Certain character-
istics of a given society and its central institutions can have positive or negative influences
on individual welfare, and many of these characteristics cannot simply be measured by
aggregating the individual living conditions. With the term quality of society I refer to
societal characteristics of this kind. Examples of important societal factors include the
degree to which civil liberties are guaranteed and social protection is ensured. In addition
to these “objective” aspects, welfare can also be defined by people’s conscious experiences.
Subjective well-being includes general as well as specific evaluations and assessments of
living conditions.
How are these dimensions of welfare related to EU policy, especially for less-advanced
countries? Although it is true that the Community is primarily an economic enterprise
without a comprehensive master plan for welfare development, there are several instru-
ments with different logics of operation by which membership directly or indirectly
influences quality of life - and thereby the chances for catching up (see Figure 1). The three
main “channels” of influence – regional policy, institutional adjustments, and economic
integration – and their pre- and post-accession effects are discussed below.
Regional policy
By far the strongest, most intentional and most direct impact comes from regional policy
(synonyms: structural policy or cohesion policy), a domain of growing importance among
the EU’s policies (cf. the short historical outline in Bornschier, 2000). Through financial
assistance for infrastructure, protection of environment, development of human resources,
and productive investments, the competitiveness of the least advanced regions and
countries shall be improved and the potential for sustainable and job-creating growth
strengthened. This economic kick-start is meant to reduce disparities in levels of develop-
ment. The EU distinguishes among different grades of need (“objectives”), in which the
strongest support – two thirds of the Structural Funds – is given to “objective 1” regions
„which face the most serious difficulties in terms of income, employment, the productive
system and infrastructure“ (European Commission, 1997, see also Figure 2). All regions
with a per capita GDP below 75 % of the Community average qualify automatically for this
aid, regardless of the national level of prosperity. Thus, also less well-off regions from rich
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Figure 1: EU policy and quality of life in less-advanced member countries
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member countries are supported (e.g. the New Federal States in Germany). Also targeted
by the EU are regions facing structural problems, high rates of unemployment or depopu-
lation. In contrast to the Structural Funds, eligibility for assistance from the Cohesion Fund
is means-tested at the national level, with a 90 % threshold. In the period 2000 to 2006, 275
billion Euro (at 1997 prices) will be available for regional policy measures, as compared to
the 200 billion Euro available during the planning period from 1993 to 1999. Given this
support, less-advanced countries clearly gain in financial terms from EU membership as
they receive more than they pay into the Community budget. The assistance strengthens the
countries’ economic potential and thereby improves the material living conditions of the
population. For prospective member states, pre-accession aid of 7 billion Euro within the
six years period 2000-2006 is granted to help with preparations for membership and for
building infrastructure. However membership status is much more attractive than pre-
membership status in terms of financial support since 45 billion Euro are earmarked for new
member states in the 2000-2006 budget. Since the enlargement will reduce statistically the
average income level in the EU, it will have a huge impact on the distribution of EU
assistance. Some of the regions currently qualifying for assistance will be lifted up in its
relative income position against the – reduced – average in an enlarged Community, and
hence will no longer qualify for the same amount of assistance than it is doing now – or even
will come to fly out of the aid programs.
Institutional adjustments
An overall positive, but much less controllable and “visible” impact arises from the
institutional adjustments necessary for entering the EU. New members must meet certain
standards in terms of their political, economic, administrative, and legal institutions and
civil society; and they must be able to take on the obligations of membership, i.e. to adopt
and apply the whole body of EU regulations and legal safeguards (called the Acquis
Communautaire). These institutional criteria were applied implicitly to former enlarge-
ments, however they have been spelled out explicitly in policy affecting the future member
states and are known as the Copenhagen criteria (see Figure 3). Because less advanced
countries are often characterized by “weaker” democratic, market, and legal institutions (cf.
IMF, 2000), the adjustments they will have to make in order to join the EU are likely to bring
significant institutional improvements (quality of society). In a worldwide ranking of 170
countries, 14 of the 15 current EU member states rank among the 30 countries with the
highest institutional quality (ibid). Only Greece is not located in the first quintile of nations.
From the accession countries, only Hungary is ranked in the top quintile, whereas the bulk
of countries are located in the second quintile, Bulgaria and Romania in the third quintile,
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and Turkey in the fourth. Since adjustments are a requirement for joining, some of the
expectable improvements take place already in the pre-accession period. In addition, the
institutional adaptations are likely to have positive spin off effects on economic growth and
the social fabric. In recent studies, the World Bank found strong evidence that the quality
of institutions and governance, indicated by well-functioning democracy, effective admin-
istration, rule of law, political stability, and a low degree of corruption, yield a considerable
economic and social development dividend in the long run (Kaufmann/Kraay/Zoido-
Lobatón, 1999). It should however be noted that some of the EU requirements do reveal
ambivalent consequences, e.g. the regulation of labor markets according to the European
Social Charta. On the one hand it strengthens the workers’ position in a variety of aspects
and improve working conditions, while on the other hand higher costs of hiring, employing,
and firing may hinder business formation (cf. IMF, 2000: 161f.).
Figure 2: Structural policy in the planning period 2000-2006
Structural Funds
Regional Fund Social Fund
European Agriculture
Guidance Fund
(EAGGF – Guidance
Section)
Financial Instrument
for Fisheries Guidance
(FIFG)
Objective 1
Objective 2
Objective 3
regions lagging behind in development (serious difficulties in terms of income,
employment, the productive system, and infrastructure)
(criterion: regional per capita < 75% of Community average)
assistance in economic and social restructuring
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Economic integration
According to theories of foreign trade, economic integration leads to a gradual reduction of
economic disparities between the countries involved (cf. WIFO, 1999). The expansion of
trade and the transfer of capital, technology, and management know-how are thought to be
the main driving forces in this process. Foreign direct investment is of particular importance
in the catching-up process, even though it can critically be regarded as a underhanded form
of “colonialization” (Juchler, 2000). Full exposure to competition also imposes costs on the
acceding economies, e.g. if non-competitive firms must shut down. The better the econo-
mies are prepared to withstand EU competition, the smaller the challenge posed by these
disadvantages. Chances are integration will stimulate economic growth – but gains and
losses will not be evenly distributed among countries, regions, and economic sectors. In the
1990s, the opening of the former planned economies led to growing trade links with Western
Europe, and the applicant countries have attracted 94 Billion Dollar of foreign direct
investment in the last decade. Nonetheless, critics point to the fact that gradual integration
Figure 3: Institutional requirements for EU accession (Copenhagen Criteria)
Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm, 14.02.2001.
Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved:
- stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect and
  protection of minorities
- the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive
  pressure and market forces within the Union
- the ability to take on the obligation of membership including adherence to the aims of political,
  economic and monetary union.
Membership requires that the candidate country has created:
the conditions for its integration through the adjustments of its administrative structures, so that
European Community legislations can be transposed into national legislations implemented
effectively through appropriate administrative and judicial structures.
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into the European and global economy has led to a peripheralization of the applicants’
economies, since the strong Western economies use the transition economies as production
sites mainly for low-productivity branches (Hopfmann, 1995). Full EU membership will
further boost economic integration, however, “the conditions to compete successfully with
higher developed EU countries are unfavorable in many sectors” (Juchler, 2000: 25).
In summary, EU integration directly affects material living conditions and the general
quality of society in less advanced countries (see Figure 1). Furthermore, one can assume
that the institutional improvements indirectly affect material living conditions. The three
“channels” of impact follow different logics of operation, i.e. the logic of distribution
(regional policy), of regulation (institutional adjustments), and of efficiency (economic
integration). The impact of regional policy is clearly positive and the impact of institutional
adjustment by and large positive. Economic integration can aid in the catch-up process, but
it also bears risks. The third component of welfare, subjective well-being, is not directly
influenced by EU policy. The subjective evaluation is supposed to take the same direction
as the objective welfare development, even though with some delay.
4 Outcomes of EU membership: The cases of Ireland,
Greece, Portugal, and Spain
The degree to which EU integration facilitates catching up can be analyzed by looking at
the cohesion countries, which currently benefit most from the EU’s regional policy (cf.
Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 2001: 122f.). Greece, Ireland, and Portu-
gal qualify for “objective 1” with their entire territory, Spain with some regions representing
roughly 60 % of the Spanish population. Annual transfers in the period 1994 to 1999
amounted to 3.5 % of the GDP for Greece, 3.3 % for Portugal, 2.4 % for Ireland, and 1.5
% for Spain. In terms of investment, the impact was even greater in these countries, with
a share of the total investments ranging from between 6 % in Spain up to 15 % in Greece.
But did EU membership help them to catch up? As measured exemplary by well-
established economic and social indicators, the answer is for the most part affirmative.
Albeit the countries performed very differently, the majority of countries narrowed the gap
between themselves and the EU average. To illustrate this I use three indicators: (1) GDP
per capita adjusted for purchasing power parities indicating average living conditions in
material terms; (2) social security spending in relation to GDP, indicating the level of social
protection (general quality of society); and (3) peoples‘ satisfaction with life in general as
a comprehensive subjective measure of living conditions (subjective well-being). A
methodological problem in this analysis is determining causality (cf. Bach, 2000). There-
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fore in my discussion of cohesion country development, I wish to note that I do not attribute
all changes to EU integration. Rather, I want to explore whether EU membership is a context
in which catch-up modernization is possible.
Level of living
Economically, with the exception of Greece, the cohesion countries managed to catch up
after acquiring EU membership (most recent data in the analysis from 1998). Spain
narrowed its gap in per capita GDP slightly, Portugal substantially, and Ireland even
overtook the EU national average. Only for Greece, the relative income gap remained about
the same. Much of the Irish economic spurt occurred though within the last ten years of the
time period covered (see Figure 4). In 1987, a national pact to keep down unit wage costs
was implemented. Secondly, massive state subsidies were offered to attract foreign
investment in high productivity branches, such as the computer industry, pharmaceutical
industry, and financial services. And not least, since becoming an EU member Ireland has
received more assistance per capita from Brussels than any other member country – and it
has used the subsidies not only to co-finance infrastructure and economic restructuring, but
also to finance tax dumping. Thus, the EU money was effectively employed to create
favorable conditions for growth (ibid.: 71; Flassbeck, 2001).
When a diachronic perspective, which corrects for the variations in duration of member-
ship, is applied, Portugal was even more successful than Ireland in the first twelve years of
EU membership. It should be noted, however, that it will be not easy for Portugal to continue
to grow more rapidly than Ireland. The reasons for the Greek failure might be, among others,
its unfavorable economic structure (still a share of 17 % of the workforce in agriculture),
its poor technological position, and especially its peripheral geographical position, or rather
geographical isolation. After all, its trend of relative decline in comparison with the
Community’s average during the 1980s was reversed in the 1990s, due to higher EU
spending on structural policy. The Greek case does not prove that cohesion policy does not
matter. According to econometric simulations of the European Commission, the 2000
Greek GDP was between 5.1 % and 1.2 % higher than it would have been without EU
subsidies. The estimated impact on the other cohesion countries was also considerable, with
the largest range for Portugal (6.4 % to 0.8 %) and the smallest for Ireland (1.2 % to 0.6 %)
(cf. Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 2001, appendix). In the same vein,
with a sample of 33 countries, Bornschier (2000) found strong statistical evidence that in
the time period from 1980 to 1998 less-advanced EU economies narrowed the gap to the rich
OECD countries more quickly than less-advanced non-EU economies. Obviously, mem-
bership matters.
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Social protection
In the field of social protection, the cohesion countries have made considerable headway in
converging with the standards of the core EU countries (most recent data from 1997). Prior
to accession (and also many years thereafter), the Southern European countries were seen
either simply as underdeveloped welfare states or as representatives of a unique and in many
aspects insufficient “Southern model” of welfare state organization (cf. the discussion in
Rhodes, 1997). During the 1970s and 1980s (in the Portuguese case also in the 1990s), social
protection improved considerably in all cohesion countries. With the exception of Spain,
these improvements mainly took place after entering the Community. Ireland, Greece, and
Portugal joined EU with a social security spending ratio of around 13 % of GDP, a level far
below the respective EU average. In the meanwhile, the gap has narrowed substantially (see
Table 1). In Ireland, social expenditure ratios have declined since 1985. However, this is
more a reflection of economic success than of a failure in social policy. In per capita terms,
Figure 4: Economic performance of the cohesion countries, relative to EU
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social spending increased constantly during the 1990s, and is higher than in the other
cohesion countries.
The trend towards convergence is remarkable because there are only few comprehensive
EU strategies for the creation of a common social policy. In part, the expansion of welfare
provisions in the Southern European states can be explained by a “normal” compensation
in newly established democracies (cf. Guillen and Matsaganis, 2000). But European
integration seems to bring about an autonomous knock-on effect, which is improvement in
social protection in less advanced countries. This is because the more advanced welfare
systems serve as models to which populations in less well-off areas compare their own
systems: “[c]atching up with other European welfare states has always been at the center of
Year Ireland Greece Portugal Spain EU 12 EU 15
ratio
EU 12
= 100
ratio
EU 12
= 100
ratio
EU 12
= 100
ratio
EU 12
= 100
ratio ratio
1970 13.2 69 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 19.0 n.a.
:
1980 20.6 85 12.2 51 12.9 54 18.2 76 24.1 n.a
:
1985 23.6 91 n.a. n.a. 14.2 55 20.0 77 25.9 n.a
:
1988 21.2 90 n.a. n.a. 14.8 63 19.2 81 23.6 n.a
1989 19.4 83 n.a. n.a. 14.5 62 19.7 85 23.3 n.a
1990 19.1 76 22.7 90 15.5 62 20.4 81 25.2 25.4
1991 20.2 80 21.7 86 16.8 67 21.6 86 25.1 26.6
1992 20.8 80 21.1 81 18.7 72 22.8 88 25.9 27.9
1993 20.8 77 22.0 81 21.0 77 24.4 90 27.1 29.0
1994 20.3 76 22.1 82 21.0 78 23.3 87 26.8 28.7
1995 19.9 75 22.7 85 20.7 78 22.6 85 26.6 28.5
1996 18.9 71 23.3 87 21.6 80 22.4 84 26.7 28.7
1997 17.5 67 23.6 90 22.5 86 21.4 82 26.1 28.2
Table 1: The development of social spending ratios
Ratio = social security spending in % of GDP
n.a. = not available
Sources: Eurostat Jahrbuch, 2000 and 1996; Hanesch, 1998; Hauser, 1997;
Sozialpolitische Umschau, 2000 (No. 60).
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the political discourse for the last three decades in Southern Europe” (ibid.: 140). In light
of both the quantitative and qualitative changes in the Southern welfare systems the practice
of labeling them “rudimentary welfare states” has become questionable.
Life satisfaction
Life satisfaction can be seen as a broad assessment of personal living conditions, dependent
upon life circumstances, but also upon aspiration levels, preferences and opportunities for
comparison. The question: “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very
satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?” is frequently asked in the European
Commission’s Eurobarometer (EB) opinion surveys. The surveys began to be conducted in
1973 and they cover all the member countries. Information on the Eurobarometer is given
in the technical note at the end of the paper.
Did life satisfaction change in the cohesion countries in the course of membership? The
answer appears to be ‘not much’. In 1999, people were slightly more satisfied than they were
before entering the Community. In most countries, there was an initial, short-lived “feel-
good factor”, followed by a retreat to the pre-accession satisfaction level, in Greece’s case
even below this level. Recently, well-being improved again by approximately 10 percent-
age points from this low, a trend which to some degree parallels the rate of economic catch
up. The story for well-being relative to EU national average is more or less the same (Figure
5). Greece and Spain made limited gains after an initial period of improvement followed by
a period of decreased satisfaction. Ireland defended its lead relative to the EU average after
a period of setback. Portugal caught up to a considerable degree in the first three years of
EU membership, but has lost some ground since then. Consequently, the countries’ relative
rankings within Europe have hardly changed (cf. also Noll, 1997). Greece and Portugal still
are the bottom-ranking countries, with a share of 60 % to 70 % of the population satisfied
(cluster 4), whereas Spain belongs to the countries where people “traditionally” show a
lower-medium level of satisfaction (cluster 3). Ireland belongs to the group where people
report an upper-medium level of satisfaction (cluster 2), but is about to jump to the top
cluster of the most satisfied EU nations – the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and
Luxembourg – with a constant share of 90 % and more of the population feeling satisfied
with their life.
The relative stability of the nations’ ranking in life enjoyment points to culture as a strong
explanation for the differences. If no dramatic changes in life circumstances occur, cultures
(and individuals) seem to have internalized “a normal baseline level of well-being that
varies only moderately in response to current events” (Inglehart and Klingemann, 2000:
169). However, the case of the cohesion countries reveals that rapid economic development
can shift “normal baselines” upward.
SEITE 16
THE PROSPECTS OF CATCHING UP FOR NEW EU MEMBERS
Figure 5: Life satisfaction in the cohesion countries, relative to EU
Satisfaction index = % of population „very“ or „fairly“ satisfied, relative to EU 8 (EU 8 value of %
satisfied people set to 100); t1 value for Ireland imputed (mean of t0 and t2).
Data: Eurobarometer surveys, own calculation.
Country National income Social spending ratio Life satisfaction
Ireland Overtaking No catching-up Defending a lead
Greece No catching-up Strong catching-up Slight catching-up
Portugal Strong catching-up Strong catching-up Slight catching-up
Spain Moderate catching-up Moderate catching-up Moderate catching-up
Table 2:       Success and failure in catching up (development relative to EU average since accession)
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Different gains from EU membership
Table 2 shows the by and large positive, but different outcomes of integration.
From previous enlargements, the following conclusions can be derived:
- EU membership does not guarantee catch up, but it makes catching up easier. Pre-
vious enlargements gave rise to more signs of (at least partial) success than of fail-
ure.
- Convergence is a long-term goal, and less advanced countries need a lot of staying
power. Even Ireland needed 25 years to catch up economically. In most aspects, the
cohesion countries still have a long way to go.
- Processes of convergence are not necessarily continuous. There are also periods of
stagnation or even setbacks, and sometimes catching up ends up not being sustain-
able.
- Economic integration can result in falling further behind when the economies are
too weak in terms of competitiveness. From the Greek experience the lesson can be
drawn that a premature accession is economically risky.
- Although EU policy stimulates development, success depends strongly on the inter-
nal potential of the respective countries. A similar framework of assistance and reg-
ulation can result in very different welfare outcomes, with Ireland and Greece being
the most disparate examples.
Although examples of successful societal modernization, the cohesion countries (less so
Ireland) still lag behind with respect to economic and technological position, research and
development, innovation, human capital investment, computer and internet infrastructure,
and so on. Since these factors have a strong influence on ongoing modernization and the
potential for further increases in prosperity in an information-based global economy, the
degree to which regional policy can help countries fully catch up is debatable. EU
membership is a key external factor, but does not automatically change semi-peripheral
countries into core countries.
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5 Prospects for the future member states
In the past, EU membership has paid off for less-advanced countries in terms of quality of
life improvements. Will it pay off for the coming accession countries, too? Since an in-depth
discussion of this question deserves an analysis of its own, I must limit myself to some
central aspects. Although circumstances of enlargements differ from past enlargements (cf.
Benz, 2000: 116), one can reasonably argue that at least in the long run, joining the club will
be advantageous in several respects for the countries now negotiating membership.
Regional policy aid will not be as generous as in the 1990s, but nevertheless will be large
enough to aid in the catch-up process. The gains from institutional adjustments will be
stronger than for the cohesion countries, given the above-mentioned deficits in institutional
quality in many post-communist countries. Economic integration (including joining the
Euro-zone some years after EU accession) will promote economic growth in at least some
countries.
Integration into the EU is not only going to influence the countries’ development in the
future – the project “EU accession” has already resulted in considerable change in the past
ten years. The countries that are now on the accession track have made much more progress
towards “democratic capitalism” (Tatur 1998) than other transition countries, especially the
former Soviet countries, and they have a much better economic and social record (IMF,
2000). And among the candidate countries, those with a more consistent preparation,
mainly the 1998 group, again have a by and large better record than the 2000 group. Given
these different developments in the transformation region, there is strong evidence that the
EU integration project is the best remedy for “Latin Americanization”.
However, regional policy assistance will be less generous than in the past enlargements.
Under the given rules, in a hypothetical EU 26 (without Turkey and Cyprus), the population
living in “objective 1” regions will more than double compared to the EU 15 (cf. Welfens,
1999). Since the EU is not planning to increase the spending ratio for regional policy beyond
the current figure of 34 % of its total spending, the result can be summarized as a slightly
bigger cake (bigger because of the contributions of the newcomers to the EU budget) to be
spread around to more regions in need. To prevent the Community’s financial system from
collapsing, total transfers from structural policy to a single member state should not exceed
4 % of its GDP (this is the guideline for the planning period 2000-2006, cf. European
Commission, 1997). This cap means that the poorest countries which are most in need – like
Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania – will paradoxically receive the least assistance in absolute
terms. Moreover, the main recipient countries of the EU 15 seem not to be willing to accept
an inevitable cut back of their assistance. Lead by Spain they are trying to negotiate for a
guarantee of subsidies after Eastward expansion, or at least for a very gradual decrease in
their levels. The outbreak of this conflict over distribution has put some pressure on the
enlargement process – and the prospects for convergence for new members.
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According to several indicators of wealth and modernization, Cyprus, Slovenia and the
Czech Republic are close (or in some dimensions above) the level of Greece or Portugal.
The long-term goal for them is to catch up with EU average. The goal for the other applicants
– which is definitely the majority of countries – is to catch up with the least advanced EU
member states. Furthermore, the new members will catch up at very different speed, which
will depend heavily upon their own respective potential for growth and wealth creation. The
prospects are better for those countries with a competitive industrial sector, small-scale and
productive agriculture, a well-trained and educated workforce, good governance, macro-
economic stability, an effective welfare state as a promoter of economic growth (European
Consortium, 2001), and success in attracting foreign direct investments. Most likely,
geography will also play a role: the countries bordering the present EU are expected to gain
the most. Given this list of success factors, each of the candidate countries has its own profile
of opportunities and risks. The countries that are most strongly tied to the Community
already, most prominently Hungary, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Estonia, can be expected
to benefit most from integration. A problem for Poland is its large agricultural sector. As
a result, welfare disparities within the transformation region – first wave accession countries
in the lead, followed by second wave accession countries, and non-accession countries
bringing up the rear – will increase further. In other words: convergence within a – stepwise
– enlarged EU will most likely result in divergence within the camp of transformation
countries. According to the EU, some of the applicants – mainly from the 1998 group – are
better prepared for catching-up than Greece (Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaft,
2001). But whether they will be able to repeat the Irish miracle is an open question. The Irish
strategy seems to be a niche strategy for small rather than for big countries, and it may turn
out to be less successful if many countries attempt it.
Although the positive effects are likely to be dominant in the long run, some of the
negative consequences – e.g. an increase in unemployment – are likely to occur soon after
EU integration. It remains to be seen how patient the population will be when disadvantages
show up first and advantages later. In the short run there is some danger that expectations
will not be met if EU membership fails to deliver rapid improvements in living conditions
for ordinary people (cf. Juchler 2001). In all candidate countries, an absolute majority
(roughly 60 to 70 %) is of the opinion that accession will have a positive effect on their
countries’ economic development (see Table 3). With regard to personal income, East
Central Europeans are more cautious, although again more people expect a positive effect
from accession than a negative one. The lowest expectations can be found in the relatively
well-off Czech Republic and Slovenia, the highest in Hungary and Romania. Thus, the
possible problem of     would affect the countries to a different extent. Despite this problem,
there are good reasons to think that citizens in the enlargement region will on average be
more satisfied with life in ten or twenty years than they are now. As we have seen above,
at the economic level of Portugal or Spain, growth no longer makes that much of a
difference. But for low-income countries such as Bulgaria or medium-income countries
such as Hungary, economic and social progress can be expected to have a much stronger
impact on life satisfaction. And since the experience of socialism is an independent
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determinant of low satisfaction (cf. Inglehart and Klingemann, 2000: 171ff.), the fading
away of the unpleasant socialist past might add to higher levels of subjective well-being in
case of the East Central European countries.
6 Conclusion
In this article I have dealt with the problem that in an enlarged Union it will be difficult for
the policy makers to ensure social and economic cohesion among the member states. A
model was developed showing that EU integration influences quality of life and the chances
for catching up of less well-off member countries mainly through three “channels” with
different logics of operation: through regional policy (logic of distribution), institutional
adjustments (regulation), and economic integration (efficiency). An analysis of the welfare
Table 3: Expected effect of EU accession by the populations
Data: New Democracies Barometer 5 (1998), own calculation.
Country Effect on economic
development
(positive minus negative
expectation, percentage point
differences)
Effect on personal income
(positive minus negative
expectation, percentage point
differences)
Hungary +66 +32
Romania +65 +34
Slovakia +53 +19
Poland +56 +20
Slovenia +46 +13
Czech Republic +45 +5
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development of the cohesion countries has revealed that EU membership does not guarantee
that equal levels of modernization will be achieved, but it makes the process of catch up
easier. Ireland in particular is regarded as an example for successful development within the
EU. Based on the general model I have argued that at least in the long run entering the Union
will be advantageous for the enlargement candidates, although it will be difficult to repeat
the “Irish miracle”. But short-term risks of accession should not be overlooked, and the
danger that the publics’ expectation will not be met should not be discounted.
One of the main lessons from prior enlargements is that although partial convergence can
be achieved, complete catch up i.e. reaching the “premier league” of the rich, post-industrial
European societies, is difficult. One can hardly imagine that countries like Bulgaria or
Romania should at once become as modernized and prosperous as Germany or the
Netherlands. The acceding countries will gain from EU membership, but nevertheless they
should be prepared to belong to the semi-periphery for at least another generation or two.
An EU regional policy with a stronger focus on restructuring along the lines of postindus-
trial, knowledge-based societies could speed up the process – but nevertheless, the road will
remain a long one.
SEITE 22
THE PROSPECTS OF CATCHING UP FOR NEW EU MEMBERS
Technical note:
The following Eurobarometer surveys have been employed: EB 3 – EB 10, EB 11, EB 13,
EB 15, EB 17, EB 18, EB 19, EB 29, EB 22 – EB 28, EB 29, EB 31, EB 32, EB 33, EB 34.0,
EB 35.0, EB 36, EB 38.0, EB 38.1, EB 39.0, EB 40, EB 41.0, EB 42, EB 43.1, EB 44.2, EB
47.1, EB 49, EB 52. The surveys consist of representative samples of the population aged
fifteen years and older in each EU member state. The regular sample size is about 1000
respondents per country except Luxembourg (600), the United Kingdom (1300), and
Germany (2000, since unification). Ireland is part of the EB since 1973, Greece since 1980,
Portugal and Spain since 1985. The figures for the single nations are weighted by national
weighting factors ensuring representativeness. When in a given year more than one survey
with information on life satisfaction was utilized (which was mostly the case), the
information was combined, resulting in one entry per year. The data utilized in this paper
were documented and made available by the Zentralarchiv fuer empirische Sozialfor-
schung, Cologne. Neither the original collectors nor the Zentralarchiv bear any responsibil-
ity for the analysis or interpretation presented here. For more information on the EB, see the
following websites:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/
http://www.gesis.org/en/data_service/eurobarometer/standard_eb/
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Notes
1 This paper is part of the research project “Welfare Development in Accession Countries to the European
Union”, generously financed by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, Cologne. I am very grateful to Anita Drever
for doing the language check.
2 Hereafter, the terms “eastward enlargement” and “eastward expansion” include the Mediterranean
candidates.
3 The term refers to the fact that these are the four countries receiving money from the Communities‘
Cohesion Fund.
4 The reader might wonder why I did not choose East Germany (the New Federal States) for comparison.
Although at first glance it appears attractive (a former state socialist country, subsidies from the EU),
public transfers received from West Germany far outweigh the transfers received from the EU and
thereby severely limit comparability. East Germany is a special case with conditions not present in the
candidate countries.
5 Even when accounting for the much bigger infomal economic sector especially in the transition countries,
the overall picture does not change significantly.
6 With the group of countries referred to as the “1998 group” (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Malta,
Poland, and Slovenia), accession negotiations opened in 1998. With the other countries, negotiations
started in 2000.
7 Or, to be more precise, at least they belong to the group of countries with the lowest level of well-being
among the 64 nations included in the World Value Surveys.
8 Only in the case of income transfers to farmers from the Agriculture Guidance Fund, subsidies take the
form of direct income support.
9 Although it cannot be argued that a higher social spending leads automatically to a better society, very
low social spending usually indicate a poor level of social protection and a deficiency of societal quality.
For the Mediterranean countries of the 1970s this was surely the case.
10 Please recall that an increase in GDP in purchasing power parities can be caused by economic growth
as well as by changes in the level of prices.
11 Since long-time series are available for all member countries, the EU 15 benchmark is applied for the
whole time period covered here (1970 – 1998). Due to the method of calculation (per capita GDP of the
cohesion countries relative to the average of the EU 15 nations), the figures for relative GDP per capita
slightly deviate from the figures calculated from Eurostat (Eurostat applies per capita GDP relative to
the population-weighted EU 15 average).
12 In this context, a study covering 31 European and non-European countries (South Asia, the Americas,
Africa) is instructive (Alber/Standing 2000). Also employing social spending ratios, the authors did not
find indications for a catch-up progress in social protection in a more global perspective. Rather, this
seems to be a EU phenomenon.
13 Due to availability of data, the EU 8 (national average of Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, West Germany) is applied as the most suitable benchmark for the
cohesion countries.
14 Interestingly enough, in a lecture the Hungarian minister for trade and commerce, György Matolcsy
announced that Hungary will take a leaf out of Ireland’s Book.
